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Abstract
Roberto Bolaño's 2666 is a novel that can be situated, aesthetically, within the traditions of utopian
fiction and the North American encyclopaedic, postmodern novel. It is also, however, a text that is
exemplary of a type of didacticism that cloaks its mechanism behind an overloaded structure. One
of the explicit targets of this didacticism is the neoliberal university that, in  2666, is structurally
twinned with the police department  and is  thus complicit  in  the novel's  femicides.  This  article
suggests the ways in which Bolaño's novel attempts to discipline the academy while also outlining
its  mode  of  crypto-didacticism.  Taking  theoretical  cues  from  Theodor  W.  Adorno  and  Pierre
Bourdieu, this article reads 2666 as a metafictional work that signals its own desire to teach, thereby
representing a fresh approach for ethics in the postmodern novel and beyond.
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Introduction
There  seems  a  duty  incumbent  upon  those  studying  the  field  of  contemporary  fiction  to
acknowledge the problematic nature of national boundaries. Indeed, many theoretical models have
proposed that the nation state should no longer remain the privileged entity for contemporary study,
seen perhaps most prominently in the work of Hardt and Negri. In an era of continued globalization,
however, self-determination still seems to be locked within its paradoxical formations as firmly as
ever, even as discourses on the demise of nationalism proliferate. Regardless of the degree to which
one acknowledges the validity and necessity of a transnational theoretical framework (sometimes
schematised  as  “TransLit”  in  the  recent  terminology of  literary  studies),  though,  language still
remains an issue that firmly divides, even on the American continent. With the continued decline of
comparative  literature  programmes,  the  occidental  academy  remains  focused  upon  English-
language works and the translation is left in a problematic space that seems still to grapple with the
dilemmas posed by Walter Benjamin in his 1923 “The Translator's Task”.  It may be that these
problems are intractable, but for meditations upon the academy, its interrelation with neoliberalism
and  the  dangers  of  national  literatures,  alongside  the  problems  of  didacticism  and  the  “bad
translation” of a “message” one could do worse than to look, as will this piece, at Roberto Bolaño's
astonishing novel, 2666, even if it is in translation.1
 2666 has been heralded as phenomenal. Impossible to do justice here to its size and scope,
Bolaño's novel interweaves five narratives concerning a set of self-absorbed literary critics,  the
university professor Oscar Amalfitano, a journalist called Oscar Fate, Bolaño's fictional reclusive
author Archimbaldi and a central section on “the crimes”, all spread across a 900-page epic. These
“crimes” form the dystopian centrepiece with which the novel batters its reader:  the sequential,
gruelling description of the bodies of the female victims of sexual homicides around the fictional
town of Santa Teresa, a thinly veiled rendition of the ongoing, horrendous reality in Ciudad Juárez.
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In terms of its literary aesthetic, 2666 is at times an explicitly metatextual work that situates itself
within two traditions: the utopian work and the encyclopaedic novel, in the latter case particularly
of the North American variety, despite arguments to the contrary.2 This can be seen twofold in the
text  itself.  Firstly,  in  response to  its  own representations  of  violence,  the  work overtly  queries
utopian premises when it asks “why Thomas More [...]?”3 Secondly, Bolaño aims for his novel to be
the  “great,  imperfect,  torrential  [work]”  that  struggles  “against  something,  that  something  that
terrifies us all, that something that […] spurs us on, amid blood and mortal wounds and stench,”
thus invoking debates about autonomous and committed art forms within a vast structure; the link
between aesthetics and politics.4
An aspect of this work that is worth considering, however, is the extent to which Bolaño's
novel could fall under the remit of a category that I term “crypto-didacticism”, a phrase denoting
fictions that appear vast and chaotic but that nonetheless aim to school their readership in ethics. In
this light, those in the academy given the task of “teaching post-millennial fiction” should be aware
that they might also read such a statement in its adjectival form: post-millennial fiction that teaches.
The broadest signal given by 2666 that it should be considered under such a mode, but also the key
signal of the target audience that the text seeks to educate, is that the university is awarded a central
place in the novel, which is certainly a dubious honour. It is the contention of this article that 2666
is  a  text  that  trains  its  didactic  strains  back upon the  academy in  a  utopian  mode  that,  while
intensely critical, still sees a limited potential for redemption. In other words, this article proposes
that 2666 is a novel that attempts to teach, and perhaps redeem, the academy, a reading for which
Sharae Deckard has already paved the way in her assertion that the first two portions of the text can
be defined as “didactic 'set pieces'”.5
Linked to this pedagogical mission, it is also worth considering the aesthetics of 2666 within
a tradition of what could be termed “fictions of process”, a brand of metafiction that asks the reader
to value the journey, rather than the arrival, the reading, rather than the having-read. As I will go on
to  show  and  to  explain,  2666  exhibits  these  characteristics  (being  composed  of  several,
anachronistic, practically autonomous sub-books and without a clear arc of narrative progress) and
can  be  seen  as  a  novel  that  instead  seeks  to  effect  change  through  subjectification  processes
whereby the aim is  to  encounter  an anticipated reader  who can then be hailed and altered:  an
“experience  book”  as  Timothy  O'Leary  might  term  it.6 Such  a  conjunction  of  process  and
subjectification has an internalising pedagogical function in which the reader believes himself or
herself to be an autodidact, even though, in fact, the text presupposed its particular teachings in
advance.
This article seeks, therefore, to twofold interrogate the didacticism of Bolaño's novel while
also exposing the role that is assigned to the university in this text, with particular emphasis upon its
structural affiliation to the police and their facilitation of mass murder. In short, fore-framing the
issues  that  will  be discussed here in sociological  terms for  both the academy and twenty-first-
century didactic fiction, as Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron put it: “[s]urely we need to
question the underlying social and political functions of a teaching relationship which so often fails,
yet  has  not  provoked  a  revolt,  and  which  is  so  often  attacked,  but  only  ritualistically  or
ideologically”.7
In order to effect this argument, this article will now be structured into two distinct parts.
The first (“Crypto-Didacticism, Utopia and 2666”) presents a background to ideas of pedagogy and
didacticism within the novel. It begins by exploring the fact that interpretations of Bolaño's text are
frequently premised on the same, perhaps reductive, ethical narrative, which begs the question of
why such a  lengthy text is  necessary if  2666  really  is  a novel  with a core “message”.  Noting,
however, that Bolaño takes explicit measures to avoid conflating empathy and pornography (thus
demonstrating a nuanced approach to its depiction of horror), this section then moves to examine
both  the  political  “commitment”  of  the  novel  and  the  particular  implications  of  the  fact  that
Bolaño's world is not its real-world correlative; the impact of distancing seen in utopian fictions.
The second part (“Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?: Critiquing the critics and the university in
2666”)  examines Bolaño's explicit representation of the university in the novel.  Noting that the
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university in 2666 is structurally twinned with the police force and also that the text ridicules purely
aesthetic  interpretations  of  literature,  I  argue  that  Bolaño  depicts  the  university  as  deploying
“strategies  of  condescension”  in  its  ethical  readings  of  literature  that  sit  in  conflict  with  the
academy's own societal position. This leads to a double-bind within the text calling almost for a
silence of exegesis from the academy. Finally, however, in conclusion, I note, through a reading of
the conflicting temporalities of the novel's title, that Bolaño's critique is not designed to silence, but
rather to raise reflexive awareness and to alter critical subjectivity; there is a redemptive potential.
In the novel's ultimate demand that people “keep writing”, despite a flawed subject position and
despite the distance from reality that is integral to writing, a more self-conscious conjunction of pre-
compromised ethics and aesthetics seems to emerge.
Crypto-Didacticism, Utopia and 2666
As I  will  go on to  show,  2666  is  a  novel  that  lends  itself  to  a  range of  ethical  readings  that,
interestingly, all share a common narrative core. This is, I contend, a result of the fact that Bolaño's
novel anticipates the reading methods of the academy and plays a complex game of schooling in
which  it  attempts  to  foresee  and  guide  the  academic  response,  a  mode  that  I  term  “crypto-
didacticism”. At the risk of introducing another jargon-term into an overly populated field, but one
that serves well to delineate a large strand of fiction from American postmodern literature to the
present, “crypto-didacticism” denotes a subform of the encyclopaedic novel that hides an essential
moralising purpose amid a lengthy, overloaded structure. The modus operandi of a crypto-didactic
novel is to cloak its purpose within a super-dense structure so that, by the necessary intellectual
capital  that the reader is forced to expend in comprehension, its fundamental normative ethical
propositions are all the harder for the reader to reject. This function is, to slightly twist Adorno's
words on the inadequacy of the concept in Negative Dialectics, at once “both striking and secret”.8
It is also, as Bourdieu might note, an aspect that most readers of such hyper-dense works would
wish to deny. This seems to be bound to a false collective renunciation of the fact that the cultural
expertise necessary for comprehension of such works can also be seen as interchangeable with other
forms of power and material capital, derived from educational prestige: “fundamentally the work of
denial which is the source of social alchemy is, like magic, a collective undertaking”.9
This aspect of Bolaño's work can be seen by sketching a primitive and crude generic history
(or at least a conferring example) from the trail that the author deliberately lays. Bolaño's novel both
overtly and implicitly encourages comparisons to the works of Thomas Pynchon. Indeed, at the
content  level,  one of  2666's  central  figures  is  a  much-lauded reclusive  novelist  (like  Pynchon)
while, formally, the trajectory of this didacticism can be traced back to works such as  Gravity's
Rainbow. To expand upon this, consider that, although it has taken critics a long time to realise it,
with some notable  exceptions,10 the  ethical  core of  Pynchon's  work can  be easily  summarised:
contemporary America's power is predicated upon instruments of death, developed by the Nazis,
built by slave labour and exemplified by the V-2 rocket.11 Of course, there is much else of interest in
Pynchon's and Bolaño's respective fictions, ethics and aesthetics, but, at a reductive level, a similar
ethical formula can be deduced from  2666:  four hundred women have been tortured, raped and
murdered, the police do nothing about it because the victims are marginalised working class women
and, to quote Bolaño directly, “nobody noticed”.12 In other words, amid rampant “gynophobia” and
omnipresent misogyny: “the women here aren't worth shit”.13
A brief literature review of work upon  2666  reveals that these basic propositions are the
foundation for the majority of critical writing on the novel's ethics, even when such readings are
executed with specifically nuanced angles. It is also clear that in drawing an ethical perspective
from the novel, critics usually posit a balancing act between an implicit “teaching” function of such
literature  and  a  critical  skill  in  the  perception,  extraction  and explication  of  such teachings  (a
balance between an intent  of  the author  and a  poststructuralist  aversion to  such thinking).  For
instance,  although  very  different  from  the  reading  advanced  here  but  also  premised  upon  a
fundamental “teaching” within the text, Grant Farred has argued that Bolaño's true focus in this
ethical setup is upon a critique of postcolonialism's entanglement with neoliberalism (focusing upon
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the marginalisation of the labouring victims), a critique that, nonetheless, further strengthens the
notion of a crypto-didactic text.14 Likewise, Peter Boxall notes that “Bolaño's fictions contain a kind
of darkened image of a common world that is the closest the novel today can approach to imagining
democracy”, thereby situating 2666 within an ethical framework of globalisation that teaches us of
the ills that it darkly reflects.15 To put it concisely: readings of the ethics within complex, lengthy
fictions such as  2666 tend, in the academy's model of an ethical turn, towards a specific didactic
hermeneutic in which the novel is seen as a disciplinary text that attempts to interpellate subjects
within its own moral framework. Indeed it could be, for these novels, as 2666's Florita Almada puts
it, that “teaching children might be the best job in the world, gently opening children's eyes, even
the tiniest bit”.16
Like many other encyclopaedic, or even simply vast, fictions, however, Bolaño sets about
opening his readers' eyes through a structure of length and overloading; to leap straightforwardly to
the endpoint is to miss the subject-forming aspect of these texts and would negate the internalisation
of such teachings. Hence, the didacticism is encoded in such a way that the reader must invest
intellectual  energy,  or  capital,  in  the  interpretation  and  comprehension  of  the  text  in  order  to
purchase the ethical payoff. Conversely, however, Sharae Deckard has already noted how Bolaño
adeptly connects his intellectuals' complicity with the contemporary environment to the historical
situation of the Holocaust.17 In the structural obscurantism of this torrential, imperfect work, 2666
also implicates the reader who misinterprets. In fact, the mis-readings of the academy add a layer of
fog that would only become complicit with the Eichmann-esque figure, Sammer, who reminds his
gravediggers that “the idea isn’t to find things, it’s to not find them”.18 Even putting mis-readings
aside, this, of course, presents a problem for theoretical literary research upon and readings of such
work. To jump to the pre-formulated end result degrades the utopic, critical power of such fiction.
This is, though, the same problem that explication creates in any form, for as Louis Marin writes in
his study of Utopics: “[t]he benefits of pleasure the textual word play triggered were capitalized into
analyses  and theses.  An authoritative power settled at  the very spot  of  what  is  not  capable  of
interpretation […] It may simply be impossible to write and speak about utopia”.19 Exegesis through
criticism  is  thereby  placed  in  its  first  double-bind  in  Bolaño's  novel:  pedagogy  against
comprehension; utopia against misreading.
In this problem of explication against utopian (and pedagogical) function, it is profitable to
consider the theoretical paradigms within which Bolaño's work can be situated. Although it is often
thought within theoretico-literary practice that new fictions require new ways of reading, this may
not  straightforwardly  be  true,  especially  across  such  constructed  bounds  as  “post-millennial
literature”; after all, this is based on a Christian calendar, a particularly problematic construction
given  2666's ambivalent relation to theological modes. What seems clear is that it is possible to
identify certain emergent trends of practice, some of which seem totally new and could require new
modes of reading, while others have a clear trajectory from well before the century's break. With
this  in  mind,  refraining  from  the  nonetheless  interesting  (and  certainly  more  fashionable)
approaches through Hardt, Negri or Agamben that would undoubtedly yield interesting approaches,
it  is  worth  examining  the  way  that  2666 stages  Theodor  Adorno's  ideas  of  autonomous  and
committed art while considering Bolaño's last novel within two opposed critical frameworks: as
political  and as utopian.  These frameworks are  useful  when thinking about  didacticism but are
nonetheless opposed because, in the instance of political success, the critical utopian function of the
artwork is destroyed: as Marin puts it, this is when utopic practice comes “to the awareness of its
own process” as “revolutionary  praxis”.20 This consideration should help to explain the crypto-
didactic  movement  of  the  text  because  it  also  exposes  the  way  that  the  novel  works  through
theoretical models of pornography and violence.
Adorno's essay “Commitment” presents a specific response to Sartre's notion of committed
literature that is relevant to the discussion at hand. Although Adorno is also highly critical of the
term “commitment” for its coercive mode of non-freedom in existentialist philosophy – a point he
outlines in  The Jargon of Authenticity21 – in the essay piece “Commitment” Adorno posits two
polarities of literature: committed art that has a specific political aim, but that “strips the magic
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from a work of art that is content to be a fetish” and autonomous art, or “art for art's sake”, that
falsely denounces its own “ineradicable connection with reality”.22 These positions, in which each
dialectically “negates itself with the other”, constitute the space in which all art, Adorno claims, has
lived;  a  space  located  somewhere  between  the  utopian/aesthetic  and  the  political/mimetic.23
Interestingly for  an analysis  of  2666,  Adorno stresses that  Brecht's  original  intention,  in which
Adorno believes he failed, was to practice an art that “both presents itself as didactic, and claims
aesthetic dispensation from responsibility for the accuracy of what it teaches”.24 The first problem
for Brecht, as Adorno sees it, is that “the more preoccupied [he] becomes with information, and the
less  he  looks  for  images,  the  more  he  misses  the  essence  of  capitalism  which  the  parable  is
supposed to  present”.25 The second is  that,  in  Brecht's  downgraded metaphors,  in  this  case the
substitution of a “trivial gangster organization” for “a conspiracy of the wealthy and powerful” in
The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui, “the true horror of fascism is conjured away”.26 As Adorno puts it
in this piece: “[f]or the sake of political commitment, political reality is trivialized” and in  The
Jargon  of  Authenticity, “'[c]ommitment'  is  the  current  word  for  the  unreasonable  demand  of
discipline”.27
2666  is, in many ways, analogous. A work of epic theatre that nonetheless “has no epic
pretensions”, the novel seeks to “make men think,” in Adorno's phrase, but it does not rely upon a
Brechtian verfremdungseffekt.28 Instead, it cloaks any metafictional estrangement in the mechanism
of its action. It is an overloading, not distancing, effect. Furthermore, Bolaño's novel goes a long
way towards a negation of Adorno's warning of committed literature's affiliation to pornography.
This is not the more recent idea of “empathy fatigue” espoused in the wake of mass media culture,
bur rather that,  for Adorno, “[t]he so-called artistic representation of the sheer physical pain of
people […] contains, however remotely, the power to elicit enjoyment”.29 While Carolyn J. Dean
points out, in her critique of this argument, that this strain of thought has a heritage as far back as
Diderot in the eighteenth century, but substantially increased in usage around the 1960s in reference
to the Holocaust, Bolaño recognises this conflation of sexuality and power that can occur in artistic
representation and so constantly reminds the reader that this pornographic mode is also one of
sexual violence.30 Every time the potential to forget the affinity between the modes surfaces, the text
reminds us that many, if not all, of the victims piled up in 2666 have been both vaginally and anally
raped.  Furthermore,  in  2666's  discussion  of  snuff  films,  Bolaño  gives  the  reader  a  strong
metatextual clue as to where the novel sits, reminding us of both the mimetic fallacy, but also the
pornographic potential that, it seems, the novel wishes to avoid: “the snuff industry, in this context,
was just a symptom”.31 To rephrase this: Bolaño appreciates the fine line between empathy and
pornography and metafictionally signposts this so that, each time the trap is open, the reader is
pointed  around  the  pitfall.  Bolaño,  like  Dean,  wants  to  express  “something  quite  a  bit  more
complicated than the conventional notion that pornography represents an unspeakable association
between sexuality and murder”, but is aware of this link and warns the reader of their potential
complicity.32
As a text that seeks, then, to ethically explore the power of fiction in the wake of mass
murder, it is worth considering how 2666 fits within a utopian tradition and also how it resonates
with other twenty-first-century novels. It turns out this is in fact linked, in several ways, to the mode
of didacticism that the novel employs and the idea of “process”. In the study of literary utopia,
fictions such as 2666 are usually not deemed important so much for the specific topoi they present,
although these are undoubtedly of enormous real-world significance and there is the ever-present
danger of disserving that suffering in critique and analysis, but rather for their more generalizable
qualities of dislocation and reformulation; a literary distancing from the real-world analogies to
which  mimesis  aspires.  This  idea  of  dislocation  and  reformulation,  a  subjunctive  thinking-
otherwise, is, of course, a key concept in utopian fiction. The notion of 2666 as a fiction of process
also encroaches on this realm however and can also be seen in other works of twenty-first century
fiction. Consider, as an example, Haruki Murakami's 1Q84 with its abandonment of resolution. This
work  enacts  a  very  different  mode  of  indeterminate  conclusion  to  Pynchon's  novels  (which
frequently end in the apocalyptic sublime, or ironic nostalgia), or even to David Foster Wallace's
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The Broom of the System and Infinite Jest, wherein the refusal to close the temporal loop is itself a
signifying practice. Murukami's novel has no such pretensions and, instead, 1Q84 presents a thrust
at utopic dislocation through its twin-mooned world, but in terms of narrative builds and builds
until the repetition causes a realisation that resolution is too late. It is utopian in the “no place”
homophonic prefix through the too late; the time that remains is too little. This encoded, again
crypto-didactic,  metafictive  practice  is  a  refinement  of  its  crude  precursor  in  Barth's  1960s
metafiction  and points  to  the  pedagogical  mode;  rather  than  metafictionally  stating its  utopian
nature, the text  shows this, which may sound like a creative writing class cliché, but is probably
more  akin  to  an  inversion  of  Frank  Ramsey's  statement  on  Wittgenstein:  perhaps  rather  than
outright saying it, the text structurally whistles it.
This makes sense as an extrapolation from Marin's formulation of literary utopia. Indeed,
Marin's table of contents splits fiction into simulacrum and signification, a schema of codes and
play  that  correspond  to  enunciation  and  the  enunciated  expression,  thus  implying  a  dialogic
structure. In short, between practice and discourse, fiction sits as the “stage,” the utopian operation
of process, of working towards, of travelling without arriving.33 2666  is  a text that deliberately
signals itself in this mode. Its city is not the real-world Ciudad Juárez but an emphatically insisted-
upon  intra-textual  reality:  “Santa  Teresa.  I'm  talking  about  Santa  Teresa”.34 The  potentially
dangerous essentialism that is engendered by this dislocation and abstraction – the creation of a
“floating signifier”, as Sarah Pollack has put it35 – conversely lends itself to a pedagogical function,
at the expense of specificity; a “teachable moment” as the present lingo might perversely have it.
Indeed, Bolaño even announces that we should read 2666 in a critical dystopic mode through his
mapping of the city space. In this aspect of the text, Bolaño reworks Marin's formulation that the
utopian  city  “gives  not  a  possible  route,  or  even a  system of  possible  routes,  but  articulations
signaled by closed and open surface spaces” in the fact that his city is mapped by the female body,
navigated by the male police officials, and mediated through the intersubjective shifts of narration
in the novel.36 To evoke Borges, as does Marin, and following Boxall's reading: 2666 is a one-to-
one map of the abstracted necropolis narrated with the body-as-text, rather than a particular, specific
space of lived horror. Yet, just at the moment when Bolaño's abstraction seems to go too far, the
transnational features of the text, with clear representations of global economy and travel, return to
lend a specificity to the location. Santa Teresa is also Ciudad Juárez but in its fictional abstraction,
Bolaño is saved from the purely political/mimetic and allowed to play with the utopian/aesthetic.
This questioning of societal independence in art, in conjunction with the idea of the utopian
tradition in  2666, prompts a return to Louis Marin and his reading of May '68.  Bolaño clearly
signals that the function of the university, or rather its breakdown, is crucial to his investigation
through the satirical portrayal of the literature professors and the pretentious high-literary writing of
his fictional author, with a cult academic following, who trails sentences thus: “then, too, then, too,
then,  too”.37 As  Farred  puts  it:  “2666 satirizes  the  cult  status  that  the  Archimboldians  of  all
theoretical stripes have assigned the elusive, Pynchonesque author”.38 Although it is worth noting
the  greater  menippean,  or  abstract,  nature  of  this  satire  in  opposition  to,  say,  “An  Orison  of
Sonmi~451” in David Mitchell's Cloud Atlas, which swipes specifically at the Golden Arches of the
capitalist  diner,  one  of  the  key  didactic  purposes  of  Bolaño's  novel  is  an  attempt  to  critically
evaluate the academy: the neoliberal university  as a site  of revolution,  teaching and resistance.
Examining  these  sites  in  his  theoretical  work,  Marin  asks:  “[w]asn't  this  the  place  where  the
relationship between teacher and student, authorized and institutionalized, could be deconstructed
through this relationship's very content?”.39
The University was proposed, in '68's grim optimism, as a “'properly' utopic space,” but how
much we had to learn of utopia in order to see the “proof of the project's failure,” writes Marin.
Most are, by now, more aware of the university's social, as opposed to cultural, function than they
might like. Indeed, it now seems barely conceivable to imagine an academy independent from the
dominant ideology, be that in its mirroring of the “capitalist industrial system” or of the labour
practices “linked to the most insidious forms of cultural exploitation”.40 Bolaño's critique of the
institutional structure is, however, more complicated than this straightforward, plaintive protesting
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would suggest.
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?: Critiquing the critics and the university
in 2666
As has already been mentioned, but will now be explored in more detail,  the dystopia of  2666
brings a  specific focus to the structure of the university  and the text appears to  mount  several
critiques of this institution. The entanglement of the university in the dystopic critique of 2666 is
furthered through the statements that show, not a site of pure learning divorced from the horrendous
events that are charted throughout the novel, or even one on the correct side of the failed revolution
of  1968,  but  instead,  an  institution  connected  by  blood.  In  fact,  the  most  transparent  of  these
signposts is the family bloodline: Don Pedro Negrete, head of the ineffectual and corrupt city police
in the text, is the “twin brother of the university rector”.41 The scorn poured on the university here is
not a simple case of an anti-academic authorial jibe (although such institutions are also depicted as
“breeding  grounds  for  the  shameless”42),  but  an  insinuation  that  the  entire  mechanism  of  the
university is twinned with the corruption of the police force that permits mass rape and slaughter;
twinned  representations  of  Althusser's  state  apparatuses.  Bolaño  shows  that  the  idea  of  the
university as a site of detached, utopian purity is deeply flawed through an almost idealist mode that
separates appearance from essence. This is achieved through the fact that the surface appearance, or
depiction, of the critics in the first part of the novel is as eccentric and pedantic individuals obsessed
with their texts, merely isolated, but harmless. Their essence, however, is one of violence. This is
most clearly revealed when they savagely beat the taxi driver who objects to their polyamorous
interest in Liz Norton. At this point the text suddenly veers into discourses of national and religious
hatred.  Bolaño's  text  is  instantly  peppered  with  “English”  vs.  “Pakistani”  and  the  violence  is
purported to embody the insults:
shove Islam up your ass […] this one is for Salman Rushdie […] this one is for the feminists
of Paris […] this one is for the feminists of New York [...] this one is for the ghost of Valerie
Solanas, you son of a bitch, and on and on, until he was unconscious and bleeding from
every orifice in the head, except the eyes.43
The invocation of feminism as justification for racial violence is particularly pertinent not only to
the  femicides  in  Mexico,  but  also,  of  course,  in  a  wider  discussion  regarding  occidental  neo-
colonialism and Islamophobia. In this instance, it is the university, through the critics, that appears
central to this violence.
As Bolaño gives no straight out-and-out reasoning for why the university can be seen as
totally complicit with this violence, it seems obvious to link it with Grant Farred's assertion of a
critique  of  neoliberalism  and  the  academy's  complicity  in  the  paradoxes  of  exclusion  within
globalisation.  This  is  seen  in  the  function  of  exclusivity  and  marginalisation  in  the  university
structure.  When  the  critics  first  meet  Amalfitano  “the  first  impression”  they  had  “was  mostly
negative, in keeping with the mediocrity of the place”.44 The exception to the group here is Liz
Norton, an educated and intelligent character, but one who is less tightly bound to the academic
institution: “[a]ll they knew about Liz Norton was that she taught German literature at a university
in London. And that, unlike them, she wasn't a full professor”.45 Unlike the other critics, Norton
sees the human being rather than the competitive academic and the association of individuals with
national placement: her “impression was of sad man whose life was ebbing slowly away”.46 Indeed,
though, “[w]hen Amalfitano told them he had translated  The Endless Rose,” one of the fictional
author, Archimbaldi's, novels, “the critics' opinion of him changed”.47 The structures of value and
worth that the academy co-opts, in keeping with all neoliberal, late-capitalist vocational careers, is
one  of  “excellence”  amid  competition,  but  also  one  that  privileges  the  preoccupations  of  the
occidental  university.  When  Amalfitano  shares  the  interests  of  the  Anglo-American  critics,  his
worth is increased. To distinguish oneself from the mediocre mass is the aim, but the “mediocre”
mass, in 2666, are being sequentially murdered.
The fundamental critique of the university's entanglement with neoliberalism is now well
known and rehearsed, particularly in humanities departments. As far as the term “neoliberal” is
useful to denote free-market-based systems operated on a nominal insistence on transparency and
underwritten by fixations on quantification and measurement, this is well summarised by Sheila
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Slaughter and Gary Rhoades:
Public colleges and universities are exemplars of neoliberalism. As with neoliberal regimes
worldwide,  U.S.  public  higher  education  assigns  markets  central  social  value.  Public
colleges  and universities  emphasize  that  they support  corporate  competitiveness  through
their major role in the global, knowledge-based economy. They stress their role in training
advanced students for professional positions close to the technoscience core of knowledge
economies.48
Clearly, from such critiques, the direct threat to the liberal Enlightenment humanist  educational
project through entanglement with the market is the main objection. This prompts two responses
that  are  pertinent  to  2666.  The  first  is  a  counter-objection  that,  as  Stephen Billet  puts  it,  “the
provision of vocational education through universities has long existed, and has always been largely
directed towards occupational purposes, despite the contrary often being claimed”.49 The fact that
these  vocations  are  well  paid  and in  intellectually  demanding areas  is  often  overlooked in  the
denunciation of the university's claimed secession to the needs of society. The second is that, if we
are to see the university and the police as twinned, as Bolaño's novel implies, then the function of
the university that is under critique shifts slightly: the university must work, as with late-Foucault's
reading of the police, to create a “live, active, productive man” but also to totalise and discipline.50
2666  presents, from this, an academy divided against itself. As revolutionary praxis, it is
failure:  there  has  only  been  a  further  entrenchment  of  the  academy  in  neoliberal  models  of
commodified education and societal discipline. As utopian project, to follow Marin's schema, the
university also falls down: the supposition of the university's function as pure and discrete from
commerce or the aims of society leads to segregation and implicit complicity through inaction with
the exploitation (and in Bolaño's text, murder) of lower class women. This is clearly seen in the fact
that the bumbling literature professors, alongside the rector who looked “as if every day he took
long meditative walks in the country”, form a group whose exegesis of Archimbaldi's texts as a
“Dionysian vision of ultimate carnival” sits in opposition to another group's readings of “suffering”
and “civic duty” in the writer's works.51 It is the eponymous critics' anarchic aesthetic and formal
approaches that prevail in the text's narrative and, in their isolated obsession with aesthetics, rather
than an integration with the social, the suffering of individuals is erased.
 When viewed in this light, the role of the university as represented in 2666 brings Bolaño's
project back full-circle to notions of commitment and didacticism. Indeed, the text begins to signal
the acceptable interpretations through which it can be read by university professors and the degree
to  which  their  position  is  pre-compromised.  In  other  words,  2666  demonstrates  a  reflexive
knowledge of the ways in which it will itself be read by academics and metafictionally steers the
reader; a crypto-didactic function. Firstly, it seems clear that the novel ridicules purely aesthetic
interpretations divorced from social  reality  as  affordable only to  an a-political,  privileged class
group (the “Dionysian vision of ultimate carnival”). For a literary-critical reading of Bolaño's work
to  adopt  this  stance,  therefore,  would  place  its  findings  in  logical  contradiction  with  the  text.
Secondly,  though, the text  also pre-invalidates sociological approaches  of the academy towards
literature on the basis of the social position that the university occupies; twinned with the police. To
speak on behalf of the subaltern through institutional practices that the text depicts as married to
violence suggests that literary criticism, in Bolaño's take, would do better to remain silent than to
adopt a self-profiting strategy of condescension.
“Strategies of condescension”, in the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, are “those strategies by
which agents who occupy a higher position in one of the hierarchies of objective space symbolically
deny the social distance between themselves and others, a distance which does not thereby cease to
exist”.  From  such  a  situation,  the  dominant  party  in  a  power  relationship  “can  use  objective
distances  in  such  a  way  as  to  cumulate  the advantages  of  propinquity  and  the  advantages  of
distance, that is, distance and the recognition of distance warranted by its symbolic denegation”.52
Bolaño demonstrates that his literary critics are deploying such a strategy in their “defence” of Liz
Norton.  At  once,  most  of  the  critics  espouse  feminist  values  (while  not  truly  valuing  Norton's
intellectual  contributions  and  instead  wanting  to  sleep  with  her),  while  concurrently  shunning
notions of equality as it applies in other spheres of liberal tolerance. In this way, Bolaño makes his
critics benefit from an ethical payoff in outwardly supporting feminist equality from their privileged
position  of  patriarchal  authority  while  also  showing  that  their  underlying  racism  is  intensely
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problematic for any kind of inclusivity or intersectionality. In other words, the benefit to the critics
themselves in outwardly collapsing the distance between their patriarchal position and supporting
Norton is transparent. The same is true, however, of their critical reading practices. While benefiting
from a  supposed history  of  liberal  humanism and civic  purpose,  the  critics  choose  to  explore
aesthetics over ethics. Conversely, however, it is also true that the rival critics, who do enact ethical
readings,  do so from a socially elevated position,  and so themselves benefit  from their  critical,
ethical reading.
This double-problem, in which criticism is scarcely possible, is reflected in another didactic
contradiction of the text: the temporal disjunction of its name. As with most utopian fictions that
have to dislocate their settings, Bolaño certainly re-spatializes his work to a fictional Santa Teresa.
However,  the novel's  temporality  is  debatably located amid a  fluctuation between the past,  the
contemporary and the future. This is especially clear when the novel's title is read through the well-
known reference in Bolaño's previous novel,  Amulet,  to“a cemetery in the year 2666, a forgotten
cemetery under the eyelid of a corpse or an unborn child, bathed in the dispassionate fluids of an
eye that tried so hard to forget one particular thing that it ended up forgetting everything else”.53
Treating the title as a year, based on the  Amulet  reference,  Henry Hitchens pointed out that this
could correspond to certain datings of the Exodus myth occurring 2666 years after the creation, thus
placing the novel's key reference point in our now-distant past.54 Conversely, as a year based on the
Christian calendar, the text implies a dystopian future; a direction in which humanity is headed as
the bodies  of the present  pile  up and are forgotten.  Amid these temporal  poles lies  the novel's
present,  which  has  to  try  not  to  “forget”  moral  lessons,  learned  either  from  the  text's  future
projection of a dystopian cemetery or from its redemptive past reference point. In either case, the
conception of time and forgetting is curious but can be linked back to a schooling purpose within
the novel.
Interestingly, what seems to emerge from this setup is that the issues of commitment that
2666 frames do not appear to be concerned solely with artistic practice; Bolaño does not seek to
teach  art  how to represent.  Instead,  broadly  speaking,  the  text's  teachings  are  turned upon the
academy. Bolaño's novel,  in its  treatment of the critics,  seems designed to discipline,  train and
encourage critics and the academy to write sociologically  engaged criticism while concurrently
negating the validity of those readings as strategies of condescension and encouraging reflexive
thought on the societal position of the university. That this metafictional signalling is designed to
teach and to alter critical subjectivity is made clear through a conversation between two of Bolaño's
characters:
'That's a pretty story. […] A pity I'm too old and have seen too much to believe it'
'It has nothing to do with belief […] it has to do with understanding, and then changing'.55
This does, of course, have ironic consequences because, under such a mode, Bolaño's novel takes
on utilitarian characteristics: it is itself as entangled in the neoliberal web of “use” and “utility” of
art as the objects of its own critique.
In this environment, it might be concluded that Bolaño's critique of the university is one
designed to shut down literary criticism. As either a hypocritically positioned critical entity, or an
ineffectually aesthetically obsessed body, what hope does the university offer in a space where “the
victims of sex crimes in this city” number “[m]ore that two thousand a year. And almost half of
them are underage. And probably at least that many don't report being attacked. […] every day
more than ten women are raped here”?56 Yet, as Catherine Belsey puts it:  “[a]ssumptions about
literature  involve  assumptions  about  language  and  about  meaning,  and  these  in  turn  involve
assumptions about human society. The independent universe of literature and autonomy of criticism
are false”.57 Bolaño also tells us, through the previous Biblical reference in the novel's title, that all
is not lost; it is not too late to begin a journey to a promised land and redemption might still be
possible. Although this doesn't get us out of Adorno's theoretical problem that, in the false world all
praxis is false, Roberto Bolaño espouses, in 2666, an ethics that asks us to believe once more in the
political,  utopian  and  didactic  function  of  writing,  both  critical  and  creative.  Critics  must  not,
though, be didactic. Bolaño makes it clear enough that this task is to be left to fiction, for otherwise
the critics become “like missionaries ready to instill faith in God […] less interested in literature
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than  in  literary  criticism,  the  one  field,  according  to  them –  some  of  them,  anyway  –  where
revolution was still possible”.58 Despite the criticism of the critics, however, Bolaño also makes it
clear that he does not want a vacuum: “[w]hat is it I want you to do? asked the congresswoman. I
want you to write about this, keep writing about this. […] I want you to strike hard, strike human
flesh, unassailable flesh, not shadows”.59 To keep writing amid the seeming impossibility of writing
seems to be the challenge that 2666 poses to the academy.
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